Why a key needs a history.

Since August this site has signed its own posts, and the review roots of Vera, with one key. Anyone could check a signature: fetch the key from a standard address on our domain, recompute, compare. That worked, and it had a flaw that only shows up later.

Ask the question a stranger asks in three years. Here is a credential from September 2026, signed by Above Beyond. Was that key really ours in September 2026? The old address answers with the key we hold now. If we have rotated in between, the answer is a different key, and the credential looks forged even though it is not. If the key had leaked and we replaced it, the answer is silent about which signatures came before the leak and which after. A document that only knows its current state cannot vouch for its past.

So on 7 September we moved the identity to did:webvh, a method from the Decentralized Identity Foundation that is did:web with a verifiable history. The document is the same and the address is the same. What is new is a second file beside it: a log in which every version of the document is an entry, hash-linked to the one before, signed by an update key whose successor was committed as a hash one version earlier. The identifier itself carries a fingerprint of the first entry, so whoever holds the domain later cannot start a new history and pass it off as ours.

The practical consequence is small and permanent. A verifier with a credential from September resolves the document as it stood in September, sees the key that signed, and checks. Rotating a key becomes a routine entry rather than a break with the past. And losing a key is no longer a catastrophe: the next one is already promised in the log, and one entry retires the lost one while everything it signed before that entry keeps verifying.

This is episode one of a series on how a small company keeps its keys. Each episode is something we actually did, and each leaves a version in the log that anyone can replay. The log is at /.well-known/did.jsonl; version 1 is this move, version 2 added the key with which Elixir, our fleet agent, signs the record of every action it takes. Next: the update key moves into a hardware token, and we rehearse losing it.

the first post in this vein, on signing what we write →